

September 12, 2005

Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc.
383 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10179
(212) 272-2000
www.bearstearns.com

Gyan Sinha
(212) 272-9858
sinha@bear.com

Bruce Kramer
(212) 272-3548
kramer@bear.com

Partha Raghavan
(212) 272-3454
praghavan@bear.com

Mary Ann Thomas
(212) 272-7431
mthomas@bear.com

Andrea Miller
(212) 272-4291
anmiller@bear.com

The research analysts who prepared this research report hereby certify that the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect the analysts' personal views about the subject companies and their securities. The research analysts also certify that the analysts have not been, are not, and will not be receiving direct or indirect compensation for expressing the specific recommendation(s) or view(s) in this report.

Special Report:

Hurricane Katrina and Mortgage Credit: Some Early Results

The most recent estimates of damage from Hurricane Katrina top \$100 billion, with thousands of people left homeless in its aftermath. From the early reporting, it appears a large proportion of the survivors may also have been left with debt secured by homes that are damaged beyond repair.

Given the important role that the capital markets play in intermediating mortgage risk, lenders, mortgage servicers, and investors in securitized mortgage pools are also potentially impacted by this catastrophe. All face a long process of determining recovery values and seeking reimbursement from insurance companies and federal agencies. In this article, we discuss a range of topics surrounding this catastrophe including insurance, servicing, the effect on borrowers, and finally, the exposure of each of the non-agency mortgage sectors.

Flood or Hurricane?

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) defines a hurricane as a tropical storm with winds that have reached a constant speed of 74 miles per hour or more. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) defines a flood as an excess of water (or mud) on land that is normally dry.

While a significant number of homes in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi may have been damaged by wind and rain, many homes were affected by flooding. Indeed, in many instances, the damage was probably caused by a combination of factors. Because the line between the two is so unclear, it is likely to be a point of contention for months to come between the interested parties.

Insurance

The reason this debate is likely to be contentious is that standard home insurance for hazards does not cover flood damage, but it does cover hurricane damage, such as that caused by wind and rain. The root cause of the damage is therefore of more than just academic significance. It is important to note that some manufactured housing policies do cover flood damage, such as those written in all states by State Farm and in eight states by Allstate (the eight include Florida but do not include Alabama, Louisiana, or Mississippi).

Flood insurance is offered supplementally by NFIP. This is because most insurers will not underwrite flood coverage because of the potentially catastrophic nature of flooding. Private carriers who offer flood insurance do so as the servicer and seller of the policies, with the liability retained by NFIP.

The purchase of flood insurance is mandatory for all Federal or federally-backed financial assistance for the acquisition and/or construction of buildings in high-risk flood areas (Flood Zone "A" as defined by NFIP). However, in the Non-Agency mortgage world, the onus is on the servicer to impose flood insurance requirements. Some servicers require flood insurance for those homes that are located in "A" zones and/or "V" zones (coastal areas), but others have no such requirement and thus could be exposed to more severe losses.

Mortgage Servicing

Mortgage servicers have found themselves caught in the middle of this problem due to the delicate balance between the rights of both borrowers and investors.

Freddie Mac has instructed their servicers to suspend all automatic payments (in the form of automatic clearinghouse (ACH) payments or monthly debits from a borrower's checking account) from homeowners. Servicers must also suspend all collection activities and refrain from reporting to credit agencies any missed or late payments through November. Servicers will also have the option of extending this period or offering borrowers reduced payments for up to nine additional months, dependent on an evaluation of the homeowner's situation by the servicer before the December payment date. Additionally, they have given the servicers the option of whether or not to advance interest during this period. Individual servicers' decisions of whether to advance will not affect investors of FHLMC MBS because of Freddie Mac's guarantee of principal and interest on their participation certificates.

Most servicers of Non-Agency mortgage deals have also adopted a 90-day forbearance policy for their borrowers. However, in these cases, whether or not principal is advanced will affect the servicers' liquidity and future losses, as well as the cash flow available to investors. Servicers will most likely continue to advance during the forbearance period, because they are technically obligated to do so unless and until the loan is deemed uncollectible. Given the haziness of the situation at the present time, a definitive determination of uncollectibility is clearly out of the question.

MBS Exposure

The Jumbo and Alt-A sectors have relatively low concentrations in the disaster zone (below 0.5%), with the majority of the properties that may have sustained damage falling in the subprime sector. However, even in this segment, only 1.16% of the outstanding amount is within the affected counties. **In this report and in the accompanying Special Report Appendix, we define the affected counties as those eligible by FEMA for both public and individual assistance.**

Figure 1 shows the total outstanding balance in the affected counties, Figure 2 shows the total number of loans in the affected counties, and Figure 3 shows the percentage of the total outstanding balance in the affected counties.

Figure 1. Exposure to Affected Counties in Millions of Dollars; by Sector and Vintage




Figure 2. Exposure to Affected Counties by Number of Loans; by Sector and Vintage





Figure 3. Exposure to Affected Counties as a % of Total Balance; by Sector and Vintage



In addition to the sector analysis, we analyzed approximately 3,000 deals in the Jumbo, Alt-A, and Subprime sectors to determine each deal's exposure to these counties. Please see the online appendix (link at the end of this article) for the exposure in millions of dollars and as a percentage of the current balance for each deal.

Rating Agencies

Thus far, the rating agencies have not issued an official statement on how they will treat the rating of existing mortgage-related transactions based on their exposure to hurricane and flood damage. Deals generally require a representation with respect to each mortgage loan from the seller that the property is in good repair as of the closing date. A breach of a representation will require the seller to repurchase the related mortgage loan.

The Mortgage Pipeline

The recent events will no doubt have an effect on mortgage purchases which have not yet settled. Although buyback provisions have always allowed mortgage buyers to require the seller to repurchase loans for which the underlying property was found to have had material damage as of the closing date, deal documents will no doubt be more closely scrutinized in the wake of serious losses being incurred due to Katrina. Additionally, many whole loan buyers have imposed requirements that a new inspection certification be submitted within 30 days on any forward-settle loan transactions. Expect a slight hiccup in the pipeline while issuers, lenders, and servicers struggle to keep up with the additional administrative demands that they now face.

Summary

In summary, while the consequences of Katrina in terms of lives lost and untold human suffering cannot be minimized, the overall impact on the mortgage sector in terms of its immediate impact is not likely to be very significant. Our estimates assume complete and total loss under the presumption that no one has flood insurance in the affected areas. The reality is likely to be much more benign.

Among all the segments, subprime loans appear to be the most impacted but even here, the affected proportions are relatively small. A bigger challenge for servicers is likely to be the ongoing task of maintaining the performance of the mortgage pools for loans where the properties are still standing. The negative impact on the local economy in areas contiguous to the flood zone is likely to pose a significant burden for borrowers in these areas and will require a careful and considerate collection effort on the part of servicers. In addition, the process of claims management is also likely to pose a significant logistical burden to ensure that insurance proceeds are collected and disbursed to the trusts in a timely fashion.

The Special Report Appendix can be found at the link below. The Appendix shows deal-level exposure to the counties deemed eligible by FEMA for both public and individual assistance.

http://www.bearstearns.com/bscportal/pdfs/appendices/2005/special_report_appendix_091205.pdf

BEAR STEARNS

Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc.
383 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10179
(212) 272-2000
www.bearstearns.com

The data underlying the information contained herein has been obtained from sources that we believe are reliable, but we do not guarantee the accuracy of the underlying data or computations based thereon. The information in this report is illustrative and is not intended to predict actual results, which may differ substantially from those reflected herein. Performance analysis is based on certain assumptions with respect to significant factors that may prove not to be as assumed. You should understand the assumptions and evaluate whether they are appropriate for your purposes. Performance results are often based on mathematical models that use inputs to calculate results. As with all models, results may vary significantly depending upon the value of the inputs given. Models used in any analysis may be proprietary making the results difficult for any third party to reproduce. Contact your registered representatives for explanations of any modeling techniques and the inputs employed in this report. The securities referenced herein are more fully described in offering documents prepared by the issuers, which you are strongly urged to request and review. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. ("Bear Stearns") and/or its affiliates or employees may have positions, make a market or deal as principal in the securities referred to herein or related instruments, while this document is circulating. During such period, Bear Stearns may engage in transactions with, or provide or seek to provide investment banking or other services to, the issuers identified in this report. Bear Stearns may have managed or co-managed a public offering of securities within the last three years for the issuers identified in this report, including regularly acting as an underwriter for Government Sponsored Enterprise issuers. Directors, officers or employees of Bear Stearns or its affiliates may be directors of such issuers. This document is not a solicitation of any transaction in the securities referred to herein which may be made only by prospectus when required by law, in which event you may obtain such prospectus from Bear Stearns. Any opinions expressed herein are subject to change without notice. We act as principal in transactions with you, and accordingly, you must determine the appropriateness for you of such transactions and address any legal, tax or accounting considerations applicable to you. Bear Stearns shall not be a fiduciary or advisor unless we have agreed in writing to receive compensation specifically to act in such capacities. If you are subject to ERISA, this report is being furnished on the condition that it will not form a primary basis for any investment decision.

Copyright © 2005 Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. All rights reserved. Unauthorized duplication, distribution or public display is strictly prohibited by federal law.

DOMESTIC

Atlanta

3424 Peachtree Road, NE,
Suite 1700
Atlanta, GA 30326
(404) 842-4000

Boston

One Federal Street
Boston, MA 02110
(617) 654-2800

Chicago

Three First National Plaza
Chicago, IL 60602
(312) 580-4000

Dallas

300 Crescent Court, Suite 200
Dallas, TX 75201
(214) 979-7900

Denver

3200 Cherry Creek South Drive,
Suite 260
Denver, CO 80209
(720) 570-2327

Los Angeles

1999 Avenue of the Stars
Los Angeles, CA 90067
(310) 201-2600

San Francisco

Citicorp Center
One Sansome Street, 41st floor
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 772-2900

San Juan

270 Muñoz Rivera Avenue, 5th Floor
Hato Rey, Puerto Rico 00918
(787) 753-2327

INTERNATIONAL

Beijing

Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc.
Representative Office
Room 1608
China World Tower
1 Jian Guo Men Wai Avenue
Level 16, Units 06-08
Beijing 100004
People's Republic of China
86-10-6505-5101

Dublin

Bear Stearns Bank plc
Block 8
Harcourt Center, Floor 3
Charlotte Way
Dublin 2 Ireland
353-1-402-6200

To access related research please visit:

<http://www.bearstearns.com/sinha>

Hong Kong

Bear Stearns Asia Limited
26th Floor, Citibank Tower
Citibank Plaza
3 Garden Road, Hong Kong
852-2593-2700

London

Bear, Stearns International Limited
One Canada Square
London E14 5AD
England
44-207-516-6000

Lugano

Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc.
Corso Elvezia 14
P.O. Box 5155
6901 Lugano, Switzerland
41-91-911-7333

Milan

Bear, Stearns International Limited
Via Pietro Verri 6
20121 Milano
Italy
39-02-3030-1730

São Paulo

Bear Stearns do Brasil Ltda.
Rua Joaquim Floriano,
72 - 8 andar - cj 83
São Paulo, SP Brazil 04534-000
55-11-3457-3200

Shanghai

Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc.
Representative Office
Unit 09, 20th Floor, Building One,
Corporate Avenue
No. 222 Hu Bin Road
Luwan District, Shanghai 200021
People's Republic of China
86-21-6340-6600

Singapore

Bear Stearns Singapore Pte Limited
30 Raffles Place
#21-01 Caltex House
Singapore 048622
65-6437-3300

Tokyo

Bear Stearns (Japan), Ltd.
Shiroyama JT Trust Tower
3-1 Toranomon 4-chome
Minato-ku Tokyo 105-6022
Japan
813-3437-7800